Abstract. In this paper, we present the first distinguishing attack on HMAC and NMAC based on MD5 without related keys, which distinguishes the HMAC/NMAC-MD5 from HMAC/NMAC with a random function. The attack needs 2 97 queries, with a success probability 0.87, while the previous distinguishing attack on HMAC-MD5 reduced to 33 rounds takes 2 126.1 messages with a success rate of 0.92. Furthermore, we give distinguishing and partial key recovery attacks on MDx-MAC based on MD5. The MDx-MAC was proposed by Preneel and van Oorschot in Crypto'95 which uses three subkeys derived from the initial key. We are able to recover one 128-bit subkey with 2 97 queries.
Introduction
Many cryptographic schemes and protocols use hash functions as primitives. In recent work [3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19] , devastating collision attacks on hash functions from the MD4 family were discovered. Such attacks have undermined the confidence in the most popular hash functions such as MD5 or SHA-1, and raise the interest in reevaluating the actual security of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms based on them [7, 6, 9] .
HMAC and NMAC are hash-based message authentication codes proposed by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [1] . NMAC is the theoretical foundation of HMAC, and HMAC has been implemented in widely used protocols including SSL/TLS, SSH and IPsec. The security of NMAC and HMAC has been carefully analyzed in [1, 2] . It was proved that NMAC is a pseudo-random function family (PRF) under the assumption that the compression function of the keyed hash function is a PRF. This proof can be extended to HMAC by an additional assumption: the key derivation function in HMAC is a PRF. However, if the underlying hash function is weak (such as MD5), the above proofs may not work.
There are three types of the attacks on HMAC/NMAC, namely, distinguishing attack, existential forgery attack and universal forgery attack. Distinguishing attack can be divided into distinguishing-R and distinguishing-H attacks [9] , where distinguishing-R attack means distinguishing HMAC/NMAC from a random function, and distinguishing-H attack detects instantiated HMAC/NMAC (by existing hash functions) from HMAC/NMAC with a random function. A general distinguishing-R attack on HMAC using the birthday paradox was introduced by Preneel and van Oorschot [10] . This attack requires about 2 l 2 messages and works with probability 0.63, where l is the length of the initial value.
In this paper, we focus on the distinguishing-H attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 that checks which cryptographic hash function is embedded in HMAC/-NMAC. For simplicity, we call it distinguishing attack. In [9] , Kim et al. introduced two kinds of distinguishers of the HMAC structure, the differential distinguisher and the rectangle distinguisher, and used them to analyze the security of HMAC based on HAVAL, MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1. For MD5 reduced to 33 rounds, they described a distinguishing attack taking 2 126.1 messages with a success probability 0.92. Using the pseudo-collisions found by den Boer and Bosselaers [5] , Contini and Yin [6] proposed a related-key distinguishing attack on NMAC-MD5 with 2 47 queries and a success probability of 0.25. They applied it to construct forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on NMAC-MD5. Fouque et al. [7] presented the first full-key recovery attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD4, and extended Contini and Yin's attack to the full key-recovery attack on NMAC-MD5. The latter was independently found by Rechberger and Rijmen [11, 12] with better results than [7] by ignoring the conditions in the last 5 steps. They also proposed a full key-recovery attack in the related-key setting on NMAC with SHA-1 reduced to 34 steps, and improved the attack on HMAC instantiated with reduced SHA-1 variants of more steps in [12] . Recently, Wang et al. [15] suggested more efficient full key-recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4 and NMAC-MD5 using near-collisions. However, all the attacks on NMAC-MD5 are in the related-key setting, hence these attacks can not be applied to the corresponding HMAC.
In this paper, we are able to get rid of related keys, and propose the first distinguishing attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD5. Based on the dBB pseudo-collision [5] , we search for a new kind of collision which is called a dBB collision. With the specific structure and high probability of a dBB collision, we can successfully distinguish a dBB collision from other random collisions found by the birthday attack. Once a dBB collision is detected, the distinguisher outputs HMAC/NMAC-MD5; otherwise, it outputs HMAC/NMAC with a random function. The attack needs 2 97 queries in total, and the success rate is 0.87.
Another contribution of this paper is to introduce distinguishing and partial key recovery attacks on the MDx-MAC based on MD5 called the MD5-MAC. The MDx-MAC was proposed by Preneel and van Oorschot in Crypto'95 [10] which transforms any MD4-family hash function into a MAC algorithm. It uses three subkeys K 0 , K 1 and K 2 which are derived from an original key K. The role of K 0 and K 2 is similar to the two secret keys in the envelope MAC construction, and four 32-bit words of K 1 are added to all the step operations of four rounds respectively. The dBB collision can be used not only to distinguish MD5-MAC directly, but also to capture the full subkey K 1 which is involved in the collision path. The number of queries in the attack is about 2
97 . This paper is organized as follows. Background and definitions are recalled in Section 2. In Section 3, we first introduce a distinguishing attack on the keyed IV MAC, which is an adaptive chosen message attack, and then extend it to distinguish HMAC/NMAC-MD5 from HMAC/NMAC with a random function. In Section 4, we present distinguishing and key recovery attacks on MD5-MAC. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. It takes an arbitrary length message and produces a 128-bit hash value. First, the input message M is padded to be M , a multiple of 512 bits. Suppose the length of M in bits is l. Append the bit "1" to the end of the message followed by k "0" bits, where k is the smallest non-negative integer such that l + 1 + k = 448 mod 512. Then append the 64-bit block that is equal to the number l expressed using a binary representation. The padded message M is then divided into 512-bit message blocks, i.e., M = (M 0 , . . . , M n−1 ), and processed by Merkle-Damgård iterative structure. Each iteration invokes a compression function which takes a 128-bit chaining value and 512-bit message block as inputs, and outputs a 128-bit value as the hash value of this iteration. The compression function has four rounds. Every round has 16 steps and employs a round function. For the padded message M with n blocks, the hash function is performed n iterations in total. The k-th iteration is the following: 
Background and Definitions
where for 0 ≤ j ≤ 63, w j is one of the 16 message words, c j and s j are stepdependent constants, f is a round-dependent Boolean function as follows:
-Output:
CV n = H(M ) is the hash value, and CV 0 is the initial value.
Pseudo-collisions of MD5
Our attacks are based on the dBB pseudo-collisions found by den Boer and Bosselaers [5] , which satisfy the following relations:
where M is a one-block message, and MSB means the most significant bit. The probability of the dBB pseudo-collision is 2 −46 . The specific differential path for the dBB pseudo-collision is shown in Table 1 . We call the relations (2) and (3) as dBB conditions. Now we define an important type of collision as the dBB collision:
dBB collision: A collision of two-block messages (x y, x y) is called a dBB collision if 1. Let CV = h(IV, x) and CV = h(IV, x ). The pair (CV, CV ) satisfies the dBB conditions. 2. (CV, y) and (CV , y) compose a dBB pseudo-collision, i.e., h(CV, y) = h(CV , y).
Secret Prefix MAC, HMAC and NMAC
A MAC algorithm is a hash function with a secret key K as the secondary input. HMAC and NMAC are two popular MAC algorithms which are all derived from efficient hash functions. Another three earlier hash based MACs are constructed by the Secret Prefix Method, Secret Suffix Method and Envelope Method.
The secret prefix method was proposed in the 1980s, and was suggested for MD4 independently in [14] and [8] . The secret prefix MAC is constructed as:
If the key K (maybe padded) is a full block, secret prefix MAC is equivalent to a hash function with a secret IV , which is called the keyed IV MAC. We denote this kind of MAC construction based on MD5 as KIMAC-MD5 which is the basic design unit for HMAC/NMAC-MD5.
The NMAC function, on input message M and a pair of 128-bit independent keys (K 1 , K 2 ), is defined as:
In fact, the outer function acts on the output of the iterated hash function, and thus involves one iteration of the compression function. That is to say, the outer function is basically the compression function h K1 acting on H K2 (M ) which has been padded to a full block size.
Since the NMAC replaces the fixed IV in H with a secret key, this requires a modification of existing implementation of the underlying hash function. The construction of HMAC is motivated to avoid this problem, and still uses the usual fixed IV . On input message M and a single secret key K, HMAC is computed as:
where K is the completion by adding "0"s of K to a full block of the iterated hash function, and opad and ipad are two one-block length constants. Basically, HMAC K is the same as NMAC (h(K⊕opad),h(K⊕ipad)) . For simplicity, we denote the HMAC K (M ) by H out (H in (M )).
Description of MD5-MAC
The MDx-MAC was proposed by Preneel and van Oorschot in Crypto'95 [10] , which converts MDx-family hash functions into MAC algorithms with a key K up to 128 bits. The underlying hash function can be any of MD5, RIPEMD, SHA, or other similar algorithms except MD4. For convenience, we denote the MDx-MAC based on MD5 as MD5-MAC.
Let M D5 denote MD5 algorithm without padding. The 128-bit secret key K is expanded to three 128-bit subkeys K 0 , K 1 and K 2 by the following procedure.
For i = 0 to 2, K i = M D5(K||U i ||K), where U 0 , U 1 and U 2 are three different 96-byte constants (See [10] for details). The MD5-MAC is then obtained from MD5 with the following modifications:
1. The initial value IV of MD5 is replaced by K 0 .
2. The key K 1 is split into four 32-bit words denoted by
which are added to the constants used in round i of each MD5 iteration respectively. 3. Following the block containing the padding and appended length as defined by MD5, an additional 512-bit block of the following form
is appended, where T i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2) are three 128-bit constants. 4. The MAC value is the leftmost m bits of the hash value.
In [10] , the authors recommended m = n/2 for most applications. For our attack, we assume m = n.
Distinguishing Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD5
To describe the distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5, we start with a distinguishing attack on KIMAC-MD5 which is an adaptive chosen message attack.
Adaptive Chosen Message Attack on KIMAC-MD5
The core of the attack is to find a pair (x, x ) whose output difference satisfies the dBB conditions, and to detect whether x and x can lead to a dBB collision by appending 2 47 y separately with a reasonable probability. The adversary performs the following steps:
1. Generate a structure of 2 66 random messages, and query the MACs of these messages. We assume that the MAC algorithm is either a KIMAC-MD5 or KIMAC with a random function (KIMAC-RF). 2. Use the birthday attack [20] to find two messages (x, x ) where (H K (x), H K (x )) satisfies the dBB conditions. 3. Let pad(pad ) be the padding for x(x ). Append 2 47 different messages y to the messages x pad and x pad respectively, and query the MACs with the two sets of 2 47 messages. 4. If a collision (x pad y, x pad y) is found, output the MAC as KIMAC-MD5. Otherwise, the MAC is KIMAC-RF.
The data complexity of the attack is 2 66 + 2 · 2 47 ≈ 2 66 chosen messages. Since we can use the birthday attack to search pairs satisfying dBB-conditions, the time complexity is dominated by the size of the structure in Step 1 (the data collection phase), which is about 2 66 queries, i.e., 2 66 MAC computations. Now let us analyze the success probability of this attack. From the above process, we observe that, when a specific message pair (x, x ) is found in step 2, our attack succeeds in the following cases. If the KIMAC is based on MD5, a message y such that H K (x pad y) = H K (x pad y) is searched. Otherwise, if the KIMAC is KIMAC-RF, no collision is found. The detailed computation of the probability is as follows.
For two random messages x and x , the output difference H K (x) ⊕ H K (x ) satisfies the dBB conditions with probability:
According to the birthday paradox and Taylor series expansion, no matter what kind of oracle MAC is, among the 2 66 messages, we can find a message pair (x, x ) satisfying the dBB conditions with probability
For KIMAC-MD5, the collision in step 4 happens with higher probability 2 −46 instead of the average probability 2 −128 . So, when the KIMAC is based on MD5, we can find a collision among 2 47 adaptive chosen messages in Step 4 with probability p 1 = 1 − (1 − 
The success rate can be improved by repeating the attack several times.
Adaptive Chosen Message Attack on HMAC-MD5
The above attack cannot be applied to HMAC-MD5 directly due to the fact that the dBB collision of H in is concealed by the outer level hashing H out . However, we can discard all other collisions by some concrete detective techniques, and save the dBB collisions. Suppose that we get a collision of HMAC which has the form (x y, x y). Denote H in (x) as CV , and H in (x ) as CV , for simplicity. Let ∆CV = CV ⊕ CV . The key of our attack is to distinguish the dBB collisions according to the relation of H in (x) and H in (x ):
1. Internal collision: If ∆CV = 0, (x y, x y) is called an internal collision. 2. External collision: If ∆CV = 0, (x y, x y) is an external collision. Furthermore, when ∆CV satisfies the dBB conditions, and (CV, y) and (CV , y) compose a dBB pseudo-collision, (x y, x y) is a dBB collision. Otherwise, the collision is a non-dBB external collision.
The adversary performs as follows:
1. Generate 2 89 one-block messages x randomly, and append a fixed 447-bit message y (taking padding into consideration) to each x. Query all the messages x y to get their MACs. 2. Find all the collided messages (x y, x y) satisfying HMAC K (x y) = HMAC K (x y). Note that on average, there are 2 49 internal collisions, 2 dBB collisions and 2 50 non-dBB external collisions. 3. For all the collisions (x y, x y) collected in step 2 , we append y = y to x and x , query (x y , x y ), and check if they collide. This way, the internal collisions can be detected. In the next step, we only need to distinguish the dBB collisions from the non-dBB external collisions. 4. For the remaining collisions, append 2 47 different y = y to x and x , respectively, query the MACs for x y and x y , and check whether a collision occurs. Once a collision (x y , x y ) is found, we conclude that the original collision (x y, x y) is a dBB collision, and output the MAC is HMAC-MD5. Otherwise, the MAC is a HMAC-RF. -If the MAC is HMAC-MD5, the attack succeeds when a dBB collision is found among 2 50.58 collisions. The probability that there exists a dBB collision among 2 50.58 collisions is
The probability that the dBB collision can be detected in step 4 is about
Thus, if the MAC is HMAC-MD5, the attack can find a dBB collision with probability 0.86 × 0.86 = 0.74.
-If the MAC is HMAC-RF, the attack succeeds when no dBB collision is detected. The success probability is about
Therefore, the success rate of the whole attack is about 1 2 × 0.74 + 1 2 × 1 = 0.87.
Chosen Message Attack on HMAC-MD5
In this subsection, we relax the adaptive chosen message attack to a chosen message attack. The data complexity will increase up to 2 113 , but the table size is reduced from original 2 89 to 2 66 entries. The chosen message distinguishing attack on HMAC-MD5 is described as follows:
1. Select a set of 2 66 one-block messages x at random. Append a chosen 447-bit message y to all the x, and form a structure of 2 66 messages x y. Choose 2 47 different messages y to produce 2 47 structures. Make 2 113 MAC queries for all of the structures. 2. For each structure, fulfill the birthday attack [20] to find all the collisions (x y, x y) satisfying HMAC K (x y) = HMAC K (x y). 3. For each collision (x y, x y) found in step 2, we determine the type of the collision.
-Check whether all the pairs (x y , x y ) in other structures are collisions. If all other pairs (x y , x y ) collide, then (x y, x y) is an internal collision.
-Check whether there exists at least one y such that (x y , x y ) is a collision in another structure. If so, we conclude that (x y, x y) is a dBB collision, and the MAC is HMAC-MD5. If there is no dBB collision, the MAC is HMAC-RF. entries. The computation of success rate is the same as in subsection 3.2. Application to NMAC: NMAC is a generalized version of HMAC as introduced in subsection 2.3. Since the above attack on HMAC-MD5 has no relation with the secret key, hence it can be applied to NMAC-MD5 directly.
Partial Key Recovery Attack on the MD5-MAC
Obviously, the distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 described in Section 3 is also applicable to distinguish the MD5-MAC from the MDx-MAC based on a random functions.
It should be noted that our distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5 can not be extended to recover the inner keys. Even though the partial bits of intermediate states of the second block y can be recovered using the method in [6] , we can not derive the inner keys of HMAC/NMAC by the backward computation because of the existence of the first block x. For the MDx-MAC, the situation is different since its secret keys are not only involved in the beginning (IV) and the end, but also in every iteration. We are able to recover the second secret key K 1 involved in every iteration.
This process can be divided into three phases. The first phase is to find a dBB collision. Note that by the techniques described in section 3, it's easy to find a dBB collision (x y, x y) with the complexity of 2 97 MAC computations. The second phase is to recover some bits of the intermediate states by the given dBB collision (x y, x y). The third phase is to recover the secret key K 1 .
Recovering Some Bits of the Intermediate States
We can use the bit carry method of [6] We implement the divided and conquer attack to recover the 32-bit subkeys 
If the 90 bits of D 2 , C 2 , B 2 , A 3 and D 3 are consistent with the corresponding recovered bits in Table 1 , we know that there is only one condition in the third round. This means that at most 33 dBB collisions (colliding pairs have the common first block (x, x )) are needed to filter the wrong keys from a 2 32 key space and obtain the right key K 1 [2] . Similarly, as there are 15 conditions in the 4-th round, 3 dBB collisions are required to determine the right K 1 [3] .
Overall, the complexity of the key recovery is dominated by 2 97 queries, which is the complexity of finding a dBB collision.
Conclusions
In this paper, we utilize the dBB pseudo-collisions to construct dBB collisions which have the dBB specific structure and differential path with high probability. The specific structure can be used to construct a distinguishing attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD5, with 2 97 queries and 2 97 MAC computations under adaptive chosen message attack. Under chosen message attacks, the complexities is up to 2 113 queries and 2 99 table lookups. For MD5-MAC, the specific differential path can be used to recover the subkey involved in the differential path with complexity of 2 97 queries. 
